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On July 4th, 1863, US Grant destroyed one Confederate army but on July 3^rd, 1863, George Gordon Meade had crippled another.  Two months later, the successful maneuvers of William Starke Rosecrans threatened to route a third.  Confederates rushed the premier I Corps of Robert E. Lee’s army to Tennessee under their ambitious commander, James Longstreet.  Soon the stakes escalated and the Federal administration sensing an opportunity dispatched Meade’s XI and XII Corps to the west.

Robert E. Lee had always told the President and his cabinet that he would need to adopt a defensive posture if he was materially weakened; but, Meade was now in a vulnerable position very much akin to the posture that John Pope had adopted in the summer of 1862.  Lee would move rapidly and strike him a serious blow that might drive him away or force the return of the deployed forces.  In doing so, he would come to a serious realization—AP Hill was not Stonewall Jackson.

Falling back, Lee was confident that he could hold a solid position that was relatively invulnerable to Meade’s probes.  Meade came forward and found that Lee was right.

This truly unique program doesn’t have the marquee value or the butcher’s bill of a Spotsylvania or Manassas but it is a fine study of the principal armies at mid game.  Both were matured, bloodied, and cohesive, new mistakes would be made.  But earthworks and prudence became a predominant consideration.  Until the arrival of US Grant it would define the relationship between these two dangerous and highly visible foes.  There is much to see with a man who personifies the low profile and exceptionally competent National Park historians of the region—Greg Mertz. 

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